Germany's Struggle with Prices for Patent-protected Drugs by Mathias Kifmann & Sven Neelsen








In 2008, the German statutory health insurance funds
(SHIs)1 that provide health insurance to about 90 per-
cent of the population spent almost one fifth (EUR
29.2 billion) of their total EUR 160.8 billion budget
on pharmaceuticals (Schwabe 2009). Only hospital
and ambulant care took up larger shares of their total
spending. Meanwhile, expenditures on pharmaceu-
ticals have been increasing at an average annual
growth rate of more than 5 percent over the last de-
cade, and thus more rapidly than overall healthcare
spending (Beckmann et al. 2010).
The increase in pharmaceutical spending is primarily
driven by patent-protected drugs (PPDs). With rev-
enues growing by 15 percent from 2008 to 2009, this
segment was responsible for 35 percent of all phar-
maceutical spending in 2009 (IMS Health 2010). Ten
years earlier, the PPD spending share had amounted 
to 27 percent (Beckmann et al. 2010; Schwabe 2009).
Germany is one of the few countries in the Euro-
pean Union where manufacturers can freely deter-
mine drug prices. For many years SHIs were re-
quired to fully reimburse these prices for PPDs, the
argument being that full reimbursement is a precon-
dition for pharmaceutical innovations.2 Only recent-
ly has new legislation permitted deviations from this
full reimbursement rule.
Manufacturers use the full PPD reimbursement to
employ so-called skimming-price-strategies. By set-
ting high PPD prices they seek to recoup their
research investments and generate maximum profits
before the patent expires and price-competition
through generic drugs sets in (Guminski 2008). In
many cases German prices also form benchmarks for
public price setting in countries where pharmaceuti-
cal pricing is not left to the industry (Pirk 2008).This
creates additional incentives for high-pricing strate-
gies in Germany. Unsurprisingly, a recent study by
Brekke et al. (2010) finds that PPD prices in Ger-
many exceed those in other comparable European
countries (see Figure 1).3
The pharmaceutical industry justifies the high PPD
prices with high research and development spending
paired with an excessive risk for innovations to fail.
Manufacturers report that only 1 in 10,000 tested sub-
stances becomes a marketable product – on average
14 years after the initial trials (DiMasi 1995). DiMasi
et al.’s (2003) analysis of United States pharmaceuti-
cal industry data suggests that development costs per
newly launched drug amounted to more than USD
800 million in 2001 (in USD 2 billion).The validity of
DiMasi et al.’s method and of the industry-provided
R&D data, however, has been questioned. For in-
stance, the US consumer protection advocacy group
Public Citizen (2001) proposes that the average R&D
costs for drugs launched in the US between 1994 and
2000 were as low as USD $100 million.
A question of basic relevance for the pricing and re-
imbursement of a PPD is whether or not it offers ad-
ditional therapeutic value4 over existing treatments,
* University of Augsburg, Germany.
**Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
1 Health insurance is obligatory in Germany and provided either
through 166 SHIs or through private insurers.The SHIs are public-
law corporations that are financially and organizationally indepen-
dent. Contributions to SHIs are income dependent. Private health
insurance can be bought by civil servants, the self-employed and
employees who earn more than EUR 49,950 per year. Private
insurance contributions depend on individual health risk.
2 Exemptions to the general reimbursement rule for prescription
drugs apply for drugs used in the treatment of minor health disor-
ders, so-called lifestyle drugs, and for “non-economical drugs” that
form part of a negative list of about 2,500 pharmaceuticals with
unproven therapeutic value.
3 To rule out that their results are driven by cross-country differ-
ences in the taxation of pharmaceuticals,all calculations by Brekke
et al. (2010) exclude value-added tax.
4 A new drug provides additional value by being more effective,
having lesser side-effects, or by being less costly at equal effective-
ness as existing drugs.and thus deserves the advantages of patent-protec-
tion in the first place. Figure 2 from Fricke and
Schwabe (2009) shows the total number of drug
launches in Germany between 1992 and 2008 and
how many of the launches represented improvements
or actual innovations over existing therapies. The so-
called me-too-drugs – PPDs without relevant clinical
advantages over already available medications – form
the gap between the total number of launches and the
sum of improvements and innovations. Me-too drugs
made up over 42 percent of all launches during the
1992–2008 period. Schwabe (2009) calculates that
expenditures on me-too drugs have increased from
EUR 2.3 billion in 1999 to EUR 5.1 billion in 2008 and
that an annual EUR 1.7 billion could immediately be
saved if me-too-drugs were replaced by generic drugs
with equal therapeutic value.5 The high prevalence of
me-too-drugs reflects the longstanding absence of sys-
tematic effectiveness testing in the German healthcare
system. With the introduction of the Institute for
Quality and Efficiency in Health-
care (IQWiG) in 2004, this situa-
tion has only recently begun to
change. Until today, the market
admission of PPDs by the Federal
Institute for Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Products (BfArM),which
automatically leads to full SHI re-
imbursement, does not require a
proof of increased effectiveness
over existing drugs (Paris and
Docteur 2008). Post-launch stud-
ies also rarely compare the effec-
tiveness of one drug relative to
others. Furthermore, the pharma-
ceutical industry’s involvement in
academia and scientific publica-
tion often puts into question the
independence of academic phar-
macological research (Relman and
Angell 2002;Angell 2004).In sum,
whether or not a PPD provides
additional clinical value remains
widely opaque to both doctors
and SHIs (Beckmann et al. 2010).
In the past Germany has made
various attempts to control and
increase the efficiency of PPD
spending, resulting in a variety of regulations from
patient co-payments and reference pricing, to physi-
cian spending caps and incentives for the import of
cheaper foreign pharmaceuticals. Cost-effectiveness
research and economic evaluations form more
recent regulatory inventions. Because of the myriad
of regulations in place, it is hard to distinguish the
effects of individual measures on PPD expenditure.
What is known, however, is that the combination of
regulations in place has failed to put overall PPD
expenditure under control (Schwabe 2009).
The new minister of health,Philipp Rösler,has deve-
loped guidelines for pharmaceutical sector reform.A
main building block is the strengthening of price ne-
gotiations between SHIs and pharmaceutical manu-
facturers. Before discussing the new proposal and its
possible consequences on PPD prices we in the fol-
lowing describe and evaluate existing direct and in-
direct PPD price regulations.
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5 The case of the statin-drug Inegy® is
cited as a compelling example.Inegy is 13
times more expensive than the existing
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Patient co-payments and reference pricing
Standard co-payments in the SHI system cannot ex-
ceed EUR 10 per prescription.An important excep-
tion to the co-payment limit rule,however,applies to
drugs subject to reference pricing,a policy first intro-
duced in Germany in 1989. Its basic principle is the
establishment of a reimbursement ceiling for med-
ical indications for which enough equally effective
therapies exist to form a reference group. Drugs in a
reference group either a) contain the same active
substance,b) have similar active substances,or c) dis-
play comparable efficacy.Reference prices are set as
follows (also see Figure 3). Within the reference
group,the average selling price of the three most and
the three least expensive drugs is calculated.The ref-
erence price then corresponds to the average price
of the three least expensive drugs in the reference
group plus one third of the difference between the
high and low price averages. If physicians prescribe
drugs that are more expensive than the reference
price,the patient has to pay this difference plus EUR
5 to 10 out of pocket.6
While not interfering with the principle of free phar-
maceutical price setting directly,reference groups cre-
ate substantial price pressure by involving patients in
the payment of high-priced drugs.The pressure is par-
ticularly high in reference groups that include cheap
generic drugs – their introduction regularly leads to
price drops of the original and formerly patent-pro-
tected drugs of between 30 and 50 percent (Fricke
and Schöffski 2008).
The initial 1989 legislation permitted the inclusion
of PPDs in the reference price system but in 1996
PPDs were excluded. Aimed at encouraging phar-
maceutical innovation, the exclusion decision in-
stead boosted the launch of pricey me-too drugs
(Busse et al. 2005). In 2004, reference pricing for
PPDs was reintroduced. To be subject to reference
pricing,a PPD has to qualify as a me-too drug by not
offering relevant therapeutic value over existing
therapies. Whether or not such therapeutic value
added exists is determined by the Federal Joint
Committee (G-BA) – an institution formed by
healthcare service provider associations and SHIs
that has substantial regulatory competencies in the
German healthcare system.
A severe limitation to PPD reference pricing is that
it is applicable only if a reference group that at least
includes three PPDs can be formed.This is rarely the
case in practice. Thus, in stark contrast to the effect
of reference pricing for non-PPDs, the 2004 legisla-
tion has not led to meaningful PPD price reductions
or overall savings (Nink and Schröder 2009).
Spending caps and individual target volumes 
Spending caps and individual target volumes for
physician spending coupled with financial liability for
overspending are instruments to generate cost aware-
ness among providers. Ideally, they could lower pre-
scribed volumes to therapeutically required levels
and put pressure on the prices of PPDs.The latter ex-
pectation builds on the assumption that if overall pre-
scription values are limited, physicians will be less
likely to prescribe high-priced drugs – in particular
where cheaper alternatives are available – and that
the industry will respond to this by lowering prices.
Germany first passed legislation
requiring individual physician
spending targets in 1989. A lack
of data to calculate individual budg-
ets, however, impeded the imple-
mentation of this legislation for
years. Instead, in 1993 a national
pharmaceutical spending cap was
introduced. From 1994 to 1997, the
national cap was replaced by re-
gional spending caps to be negotiat-
ed between the regional physician
and SHI associations. These were
abolished in 1998 – only to make a
quick comeback from 1999 until
6 Furthermore, there are provisions to promote continuous compe-
tition in the low-price segment of reference groups. For example,
drugs priced 30 percent below the reference price are exempt from
any patient co-payment.The reference price level is adjusted regu-
larly to accommodate overall price changes.
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Figure 32001. The regional capping policy
stipulated that SHIs could reclaim
their payments from the pharma-
ceutical industry and from Ger-
many’s 23 regional physicians asso-
ciations if spending exceeded the
respective regional cap.
National and regional caps helped
to contain pharmaceutical expen-
diture. In the first year after the
1993 reform, for instance, a de-
crease in the number of prescrip-
tions and a rise in the use of ge-
nerics reduced SHI expenditures
by over EUR 1.5 billion (Busse et
al. 2005).A major problem of the
caps, however, was that financial
liability could not properly be enforced. Physicians
associations successfully refused the payments,
claiming that a lack of data impaired their capacity
to efficiently manage regional expenditure. In addi-
tion,legal concerns were raised over the mechanism of
collective liability that imposed financial fines on
physicians irrespective of their individual prescrip-
tion behavior.The ongoing legal uncertainty lead to
the abolishment of the regional caps in 2001. In
response, overall drug expenditure increased by 10
percent in the first half of that year to again reach
the level it had assumed before the caps were first
introduced (Breyer 2002).
While the 2001 legislation abolished collective liabil-
ity, it introduced individual physician prescription
target volumes that remain in place to date.Today’s
target volumes consider the medical specialty in
which physicians are active, the demography of their
patients and changes in pharmaceutical prices and to
the SHI benefit catalogue (Paris and Docteur 2008).
Physicians who exceed their target by over 15 per-
cent are advised to review their prescription prac-
tices. Overspending by more than 25 percent re-
quires a written explanation. If the explanation is
judged insufficient, physicians have to pay back to
the SHIs the difference between 115 percent of the
target and their total spending. The spending cap
mechanism is summarized in Figure 4.
While there is good evidence that spending caps and
target volumes have reduced prescriptions by physi-
cians, it is less clear to what extent such rationing
strategies are in the public interest. Critics of spend-
ing caps argue that capping may lead to inefficient
rationing and unwanted substitution effects in other
healthcare sectors (Drummond and Jönsson 2003;
Schreyögg and Busse 2005). For instance, Henke et
al. (1994) and Schulenburg (1997) found evidence
that physicians seek to avoid surpassing their indi-
vidual budgets by shifting patients to specialists and
hospitals.Schöffski (1996) calculated that this substi-
tution inflicted an additional EUR 700 million in
costs per year on the SHIs.To what degree spending
caps and target volumes have affected price setting
strategies for producers of PPD is not known.
Promotion of pharmaceutical imports
Since 1989, German pharmacies have been legally
obliged to substitute locally marketed drugs with im-
ports if identical imported drugs are available at a
lower price.Since this is the case for many drugs,the
substitution regulation had a potentially large im-
pact. Monitoring, however, varied considerably by
region and overall implementation levels were low.
In 1996, the substitution-obligation was repealed
altogether, only to be re-introduced in 1999.
In 2002,new legislation established minimum import
sales quotas for pharmacies, requiring that 5.5 per-
cent of revenues charged by pharmacies to each SHI
had to come from imports. This quota increased to 
7 percent in the following year.At the same time,tar-
gets for the use of imported drugs were set in nego-
tiations between regional SHI and physician associ-
ations. The reform caused an immediate increase in
the market share of imported pharmaceuticals to a
7.2 percent peak (VFA 2009, see Figure 5).
CESifo DICE Report 3/2010 46
Reform Models
Review if > 115 % of target
115 and ≤ 125 % of target
Self-review of prescriptions required
Prescripton Target
Depends on speciality, demography, pharmaceutical prices, sickness fund benefit catalogue
.
PHYSICIAN TARGET VOLUMES





Pay any amount between 115 % of target
and prescribed amount
Review if > 115 % of target
115 and ≤ 125 % of target
Self-review of prescriptions required
Prescripton Target
Depends on speciality, demography, pharmaceutical prices, sickness fund benefit catalogue
PHYSICIAN TARGET VOLUMES





Pay any amount between 115 % of target
and prescribed amount
Source: Own illustration.
Figure 4CESifo DICE Report 3/2010 47
Reform Models
In 2004,however,the bar for pharmaceutical imports
rose.The pharmacy import quota was again reduced
to 5 percent and the price difference between non-
imported drugs and imports required to trigger ob-
ligatory substitution was increased from 10 to 15 per-
cent (or a minimum of  EUR 15).As a consequence,
the market share of imported drugs decreased while
overall expenditures rose.
The negative effect of the 2004 reform was tempo-
rary, however, as in 2008, the market share of im-
ported pharmaceuticals reached a record 9 percent
(VFA 2009). For 2006, the Association of German
Pharmaceuticals Importers (VAD) estimated that
further increases in the use of imported drugs would
have lowered pharmaceutical expenditures by up to
EUR 200 million per year (Prognos AG 2006).
Overall, the obligation to sell imported products has
put considerable pressure on the price of PPDs.Phar-
maceutical manufacturers have therefore sought to
avoid this regulation by hindering the free operation
of pharmaceutical importers in the past (Geller 2008)
and by lobbying against import quotas (VFA 2010).
Manufacturer price moratoriums and compulsory
rebates
To tackle the continuing increase in PPD expendi-
ture, German policymakers have on several occa-
sions diverged from the basic principle of free price
setting and imposed price freezes and compulsory
rebates on the industry.
In 1993 and 1994, pharmaceutical manufacturers were
for the first time obliged to give SHIs a 5 percent re-
bate  for drugs outside the refer-
ence price system.Moreover,new-
ly introduced drugs were subject-
ed to a price moratorium during
those two years.
Obligatory rebates on PPDs al-
most made a comeback when new
health minister Ulla Schmidt at-
tempted to introduce a 4 percent
rebate for 2002 and 2003. Savings
projections for the rebates rang-
ed as high as  EUR 960 million
(Busse et al. 2005). The price cut
was however stopped at the last
minute by extensive lobbying that
instead led to the pharmaceutical
industry paying the SHIs a lump sum of EUR 200 mil-
lion.Not only did the industry save up to EUR 760 mil-
lion in revenue but it also avoided a negative price sig-
nal for countries referencing their pharmaceutical
prices to those in Germany.
In 2003, however, the mounting cost pressure finally
led to a 6 percent obligatory rebate on all non-refer-
enced price drugs including PPDs. The rebate was
further increased to 16 percent in 2004. In 2005, it
was again reduced to 6 percent, where it remained
until June 2010. In addition, a price moratorium was
imposed on all prescription drugs from April 2006 to
March 2008. For 2009, recent data suggest that over-
all obligatory manufacturer rebates to SHIs amount-
ed to EUR 852 million (IMS Health 2010).
Surprisingly, the newly elected center-right coalition
government continued on this path in 2010. Its first
major piece of healthcare legislation again increased
the rebate on non-reference-priced drugs to 16 per-
cent. This was accompanied by an unprecedented
price freeze with retrospective effect from August
2009 to December 2013. Figure 6 provides an over-
view of compulsory rebates and price moratoriums
in Germany since 1993.
Clearly, price moratoriums and compulsory rebates
are effective short-term measures to control phar-
maceutical prices and expenditure. However, they
are ineffective when it comes to new drugs as the ma-
nufacturer can still set prices freely when the drugs
are launched.A further problem is that prices are cut
across the board.There is no discrimination based on
a drug’s therapeutic value added.This again highlights
the need for economic evaluations, which have only
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Figure 5Economic evaluation of therapeutic value
In 2007, the principle of full reimbursement of
PPDs for which no reference group could be form-
ed was eliminated. Instead, reimbursement ceilings
for these drugs were now permitted. If the manufac-
turer charges a price that exceeds the reimbursement
ceiling, the difference must be paid out of pocket by
the patient.The level of SHI reimbursement is deter-
mined on the basis of an economic evaluation by
IQWiG. However, because no such evaluation has
been concluded to date, reimbursement ceilings as a
potentially important instrument of PPD price con-
trol have yet to be put to use. This delay in im-
plementation is mainly a result of IQWiG choosing
to develop an entirely new method for economic
evaluation instead of using established methods like
cost-benefit and cost-utility analysis (see Zweifel et
al. 2009 for an overview).
IQWiG’s key methodological con-
cept is the “efficiency frontier”
(IQWiG 2009).In a cost-utility dia-
gram, the frontier is defined by
the combination of therapies that
yields the maximum utility at a
given cost level. IQWiG has opted
to measure utility by indication-
specific indicators. To determine
the frontier,the cost and utility of
all existing therapies in an indica-
tion must be assessed. Therapies
which are both more costly and
less effective than others are clas-
sified as inefficient. Moreover, if
a combination of two therapies –
one less costly and less effective
and one more costly and more effective than a third
therapy – creates more total utility at lesser cost than
a third therapy, the third therapy is also graded inef-
ficient by the principle of extended dominance
(Weinstein 1990).
Figure 7 shows the efficiency frontier for an indica-
tion with two efficient drugs A and B.The connecting
lines represent combinations of these therapies.
Based on this frontier, an economic evaluation is
performed. If a new PPD falls in area I, it does not
receive a positive evaluation as it is inefficient. Inter-
estingly, IQWiG neither recommends PPDs in area
IIa although such drugs are more cost-effective than
the existing therapies. The reason cited here is that
new drugs should not lower the level of care in an 
indication.PPDs in area IIb which are more effective
than the current best therapy but less costly,are eval-
uated positively and recommended for full reim-
bursement. For PPDs which are
more effective and more costly
– as will most often be the case –
IQWiG states that a new drug
should “not lead to a deteriora-
tion of efficiency in a given thera-
peutic area measured against the
efficiency frontier” (IQWiG 2009).
Such a deterioration is avoided if
the new therapy lies on or above
the extrapolated frontier in Fi-
gure 7. In this case, the incremen-
tal utility-cost ratio between the
hitherto most effective drug B
and the new drug would be at
least as high as the incremental
utility-cost ratio between drugs A
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EXTRAPOLATION OF THE EFFICIENCY FRONTIER BY IQWiG
Source: Own illustration.
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and B. Graphically the reimbursement ceiling corre-
sponds to the level of cost which places a new drug
on the extrapolated frontier. Consider, for example,
a drug X which generates utility UXin Figure 7.The
reimbursement ceiling would be RX.
IQWiG’s approach has been received with great
skepticism by German and international health eco-
nomists (Ausschuss für Gesundheitsökonomie im
Verein für Socialpolitik 2008; Drummond and Rutten
2008; Kifmann 2010). A practical problem is that the
construction of the efficiency frontier requires up-to-
date and comparable cost and utility data which is not
available for most therapies. The commissioning of
additional studies would most likely involve consider-
able time and financial costs. A more fundamental
criticism, however, concerns the refusal to compare
the utility increments of innovative drugs across indi-
cations. IQWiG states in its methods: “The intention
of the health economic evaluation is … neither to
establish priorities for resource consumption across
the whole health system nor to take account of asso-
ciated trade-offs” (IQWiG 2009).This statement puts
into question the very purpose of economic evalua-
tion – enabling an efficient distribution of limited
healthcare resources. In line with IQWiG’s rejection
of efficiency reviews across indications is its decision
to use indication-specific utility measures rather than
a generic measure like Quality-Adjusted Life Years
(QALYs), as used by IQWiG’s English pendant, the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE).Furthermore,IQWiG’s method of evaluation
is prone to leading to different reimbursement stan-
dards across indications. In particular, this standard
will be lower in areas with low incremental utility-cost
ratio, creating the danger of “adding inefficiencies to
inefficiencies” (Drummond and Rutten 2008).
Apart from the validity of IQWiG’s method,there are
concerns with the setting of a reimbursement ceiling
for PPDs itself.The reimbursement ceiling rule allows
that a pharmaceutical company can charge a higher
price.The difference between the reimbursed amount
and the manufacturer price must be paid by the
patient. This causes allocational and distributional
problems. Given that the reimbursement ceiling
reflects the societal willingness to pay for a PPD, a
manufacturer price above the ceiling exceeds this
willingness to pay.In total,SHI and patients therefore
pay more than what is adequate from a social point of
view. Furthermore, the reimbursement ceiling for a
PPD with higher utility at higher cost lies above the
full reimbursement for the second most effective drug
in the indication. Consider drug X in Figure 7. The
reimbursement ceiling is RX which is higher than the
cost of drug B. If the price exceeds RX, patients who
have the means to buy the new drug receive a high-
er reimbursement than patients who can only afford
the fully reimbursed second most effective drug B.
This is at odds with the principle of solidarity in health-
care advocated in Germany’s public healthcare system.
A stricter reimbursement rule that provides reimburse-
ment only if the manufacturer price does not exceed
the reimbursement ceiling would avoid this problem.
Overall,the limitation to disease-specific utility mea-
sures and the avoidance of utility comparisons across
indications make it doubtful whether IQWiG’s work
can inform rational reimbursement decisions.The ex-
trapolation of the efficiency frontier will most likely
create different reimbursement standards across indi-
cations. Furthermore, the practicability of IQWiG’s
approach remains an open question.
The new approach: negotiations – arbitration –
evaluation 
In spring 2010, the new government adopted a draft
bill containing a new approach towards the market
for PPDs (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2010).
Price negotiations between the SHIs and manufac-
turers form the main building block of this new cost
containment effort that will be debated in parlia-
ment this fall.
Price negotiations are not an entirely new instrument
in the German healthcare system. Since 2003, individ-
ual SHIs can negotiate rebates with pharmaceutical
manufacturers.At first, however, the negotiations only
played a minor role.This changed in 2007 when phar-
macies were obligated to preferentially sell drugs of
manufacturers with which the patient’s SHI had nego-
tiated a rebate (unless the prescribing physician had
explicitly ruled out the substitution). In response to
this new regulation, the market share of pharmaceuti-
cals under negotiated rebate contracts greatly in-
creased. The largest German SHI, AOK, for instance,
estimates that negotiated rebates have saved it EUR
1 billion between 2007 and 2010 (Beckmann et al.2010).
To date price negotiations have only been effective,
however,for indications for which several competing
drugs are available. By contrast, in the case of PPDs
with unique therapeutic value,there is no incentive for
manufacturers to give rebates:as a monopolistic sup-plier they cannot expect sales volumes to increase
through a rebate contract that warrants preferential
sale of their drug.
The new government’s approach makes negotiations
the standard method for PPD price setting.The pro-
posed mechanism consists of three stages that are
also summarized in Figure 8.
The negotiation stage
The manufacturer continues to set a PPD’s price
freely at its market launch. Within three months of
the launch, a rapid assessment of the new drug’s ad-
ditional therapeutic value is carried out by or under
the auspices of the Federal Joint Committee. For the
rapid assessment and all further evaluations the new
legislation stipulates that manufacturers must make
available all clinical studies – irrespective of their
outcome.Drugs with no additional therapeutic value
are either assigned to a reference group or, if no ref-
erence group exists, given a price that is cost-neutral
compared to alternative therapies. If a drug is supe-
rior to existing medications, the National Associa-
tion of SHIs and the manufacturer negotiate a re-
bate on the launching price.An agreement has to be
reached within six months after the rapid assessment
is concluded. The resulting rebate contract may
include agreements on supplied volumes.
The arbitration stage
If no rebate agreement is reached in time, an arbi-
tration committee sets a binding price within three
months that becomes effective from the 13th month
after market launch. In its pricing decision the com-
mittee is encouraged to consider prices in other Eu-
ropean countries. The committee is formed by two
representatives of the National Association of SHIs,
two representatives of the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer and three independent members agreed upon
by the National Association of SHIs and the manu-
facturer.If the two parties fail to reach an agreement
on the independent members, the decision is taken
by drawing lots.
The evaluation stage
Following the arbitration committee’s decision, both
the National Association of SHIs and the manu-
facturer can request an economic evaluation by
IQWiG. Its results form the basis for re-negotiations
between the National Association of SHIs and the
manufacturer. If no agreement can be reached, the
arbitration committee sets the price based on the
economic evaluation’s findings.
At any stage of the new price setting mechanism,indi-
vidual SHIs can negotiate exclusive rebate contracts
CESifo DICE Report 3/2010 50
Reform Models
PPD PRICE SETTING IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT’S REFORM PROPOSAL
Within three months: Rapid assessment of effectiveness by Federal Joint Committee
Additional benefits
Reference group No Reference group Rebate negotiations between National Association of SHIs and manufacturer
Reference pricing Cost-neutral price set No rebate agreement within six months Rebate agreement within six months
National Association of SHIs and manufacturer
accept price
Negotiation Stage
Launch: free price setting and submission of effectiveness studies
No rebate agreement Rebate agreement
Arbitration committee can adjust rebate according
to evaluation results
No additional benefits
National Association of SHIs or manufacturer
request economic evaluation
New negotiations upon evaluation results
Manufacturer can supply new post-launch studies on effectiveness
and cost (max. 3 years) as the basis for economic evaluation by IQWiG
Arbitration Stage
Arbitration Committee sets price considering European average
In effect starting 13th month after market launch
Evaluation Stage
Source: Own illustration.
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with manufacturers on the condition that the resulting
price does not exceed the level determined through
the central negotiations between the National Asso-
ciation of SHIs and the manufacturers.The new nego-
tiation scheme not only applies to newly introduced
PPDs but also to PPDs already marketed.
Essentially, the bill eliminates the manufacturers’
right to set PPD prices freely and forces them to give
SHIs a rebate on their list price. If enacted, it can be
expected to have a strong impact on PPD prices.
Rapid assessments may result in identifying me-too
drugs more quickly. For drugs with additional thera-
peutic value, the reference to prices in other Euro-
pean countries in the arbitration stage will likely
generate downward pressure on prices. If, for exam-
ple, the arbitration committee sets prices close to a
European average,the National Association of SHIs
has little reason to agree on a higher price in the
negotiation stage.
The outcome of future economic evaluations in the
third stage is difficult to predict. In particular, it is un-
clear to what extent IQWiG’s efficiency frontier
methodology will be used. The method was originally
designed to recommend reimbursement ceilings for
PPDs.Such ceilings,however,are no longer required in
a price setting system that builds on the negotiation of
rebates on manufacturer list prices. Furthermore,
under the new law, the Federal Joint Committee can
specify what existing therapies are to be used by
IQWiG for its comparison.This eliminates the univer-
sal assessment needed to construct the efficiency fron-
tier. At the same time, however, the extrapolation
method can no longer be used for guidance.This shows
that the government’s new approach towards PPDs is
only a first step. An evaluation method that is both
transparent and coherent must still be developed.
Concluding remarks 
PPDs have been the main driver of the strong in-
crease in pharmaceutical spending Germany has ex-
perienced in recent years.To regain cost control,law-
makers have taken a variety of direct and indirect
measures to regulate PPD prices. These regulations
attempt to sidestep the principle of free price setting
and full reimbursement of PPDs, which unlike most
other countries is still upheld in Germany.
The combination of patient co-payments and refer-
ence prices has been successful for drugs whose
patents have expired. This instrument, however, has
had little effect on PPD prices and expenditures
because reference group requirements for PPDs
remain high. By contrast, physician spending caps
have been effective for cost containment but their
effects in terms of rationing and cost-shifting to
other SHIs are questionable.The promotion of phar-
maceutical imports has also placed pressure on Ger-
man pharmaceutical prices.
Price moratoriums and compulsory rebates have
often been used to contain pharmaceutical spending.
However, these measures do not affect price setting
for newly launched drugs. They do not take into ac-
count the varying therapeutic value of PPDs and
may thus hamper the incentive for true innovation.
Here, economic evaluations could inform efficient
PPD reimbursement decisions. However, IQWiG’s
current methodology does not seem to be suited to
meet this objective.It is prone to leading to different
reimbursement standards across indications.
The new government’s reform proposal represents a
radical change in policy. It practically eliminates the
right of manufacturers to set PPD prices freely as
they will be forced to offer SHIs a rebate on their list
price. If the two parties do not reach a timely rebate
agreement, an arbitration committee will set a bind-
ing price with reference to prices in other European
countries. This price can only be changed following
an economic evaluation that either party can request.
If enacted, the new law is likely to generate down-
ward pressure on PPD prices, in particular through
reference to prices in other European countries in
the arbitration stage. A crucial question is to what
degree the option to request an economic evaluation
will affect negotiated outcomes.Among other things,
this will depend on the evaluation method. Here the
new law offers a chance to reconsider IQWiG’s cur-
rent methodology. Ultimately, prices for PPDs can
only be set in a meaningful way if their therapeutic
value is evaluated with a sound method.
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